Evaluating the ‘Swedish Solution’
/in 73rd Economic Policy Panel/by Dirk Krueger, Harald Uhlig , Taojun XieUnsafe Jobs, Labour Market Risk and Social Protection
/in 73rd Economic Policy Panel/by Alessandro Caiumi, Gaetano Basso, Marco Paccagnella , Tito BoeriNon-Pharmaceutical Interventions Against the 1918 Influenza
/in 73rd Economic Policy Panel/by Guillaume ChapelleSmart hedging against carbon leakage
/in 72nd Economic Policy Panel/by Christoph Böhringer, Knut Einar Rosendahl , Halvor StorrøstenPolicy makers in the EU and elsewhere are concerned that unilateral pricing of the carbon externality induces carbon leakage through relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed production to other regions. A common measure to mitigate such leakage is to combine an emission trading system with output-based allocation (OBA) of allowances where the latter works as an implicit production subsidy to regulated industries. We show analytically that it is optimal to impose in addition a consumption tax on the OBA goods (i.e., goods that are entitled to OBA) at a rate which is equivalent in value to the OBA subsidy rate. The explanation is that the consumption tax alleviates excessive consumption of the OBA goods, which is a distortionary effect of introducing output-based allocation. Using a multi-region multi-sector computable general equilibrium model calibrated to empirical data, we quantify the welfare gains for the EU of imposing such a consumption tax on top of its existing emission trading system with OBA. We run Monte Carlo simulations to account for uncertain leakage exposure of goods entitled to OBA. The consumption tax increases welfare whether the goods are highly exposed to leakage or not, and hence can be regarded as smart hedging against carbon leakage.
Green Deal policies could raise emissions
/in 72nd Economic Policy Panel/by Reyer Gerlagh, Roweno JRK Heijmans , Knut Einar RosendahlThe Market Stability Reserve (MSR), implemented in 2018 to complement the EU emission trading system (EU ETS), is designed such that the supply of allowances responds endogenously to demand. We show that an endogenous cap such as the MSR produces a Green Paradox. Abatement policies announced early but realized in the future are counter-effective because of the MSR: they increase cumulative emissions. We present the mechanisms in a two-period model, and then provide quantitative evidence of our result for an annual model disciplined on the price rise in the EU ETS that followed the introduction of the MSR. Our results point to the need for better coordination between different policies, such as the ‘European Green Deal’. We conclude with suggestions to improve the workings of an endogenous cap, ahead of the MSR review scheduled for 2021.
Carbon taxes to avert climate disaster
/in 72nd Economic Policy Panel/by Laurence Kotlikoff, Felix Kubler, Simon Scheidegger , Andrey PolbinHot climates and cold economies
/in 72nd Economic Policy Panel/by Christina Gresser, Daniel Meierrieks , David StadelmannWe study the link between temperature and economic development at the sub-national level, employing cross-sectional data from two distinct sources. In contrast to the existing cross-country literature on the temperature-income relationship, our setting allows for the inclusion of country fixed effects. Once accounting for country fixed effects, we do not find a statistically robust relationship between regional temperature and three different measures of regional economic development (per capita GDP, nightlights and gross cell production). We also test whether temperature is non-linearly related to regional income (with hotter regions being potentially particularly prone to adverse effects of temperature on income) but find no systematic evidence in favor of such a relationship. Finally, we examine whether the effect of temperature on economic development is especially pronounced in poorer regions (e.g., due to weaker adaptation). Again, there is no statistically robust evidence for such a link.
European’s banks’ susceptibility to loan losses
/in 72nd Economic Policy Panel/by Isabella Wolfskeil, Lucia Alessi, Brunella Bruno, Elena Carletti , Katja NeugebauerWe analyze the determinants of coverage ratios and their components (NPLs and loss loan reserves) in a large sample of European banks. We find that bank-specific factors, and in particular credit risk variables including forward-looking indicators, matter the most. We also uncover that coverage ratios do not adjust sufficiently when asset quality deteriorates but that high-NPL banks tend to be relatively better covered. At the country level, specific macroprudential levers as well as developing NPL secondary markets enhance bank coverage policy. Our findings emphasize the importance of micro prudential oversight and call for more stringent macro policies in high-NPL countries.

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